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摘要
本港應否實行銀行存款保險備受爭議。大銀行普
遍反對，其它銀行則多表贊成。反對存款保險者指它
會引發道德風險，使銀行為逐高回報而罔顧風險。其
實，只要採取「分數式」存款保險，銀行進行高風險
投資的動機即能減少，再配合慎密的監管，存款保險
絕對不會危及銀行體系的穩定性。事實上，存戶一般
無法洞悉銀行運作情況，在沒有存保下，被迫存款於
大銀行。大銀行恃其大反而可能會進行高風險投資 ，
同時又給存戶較低的息率。有了存保，金管局便毋須
懼怕大銀行倒閉引起的衝擊，便可以容許不當經營的
大銀行倒閉。從這個角度看，設計完善的存款保險除
增加銀行體系的穩定性，更可促進健康的競爭和減低
道德風險。

The Lingnan Commentary is an attempt to assert
The H.K. Monetary Authority has been advised by
Lingnan’s unfailing interest and commitment to serve Hong
its consultants to introduce a bank deposit protection plan
Kong and the world. It is a quarterly review of economic,
that would in the first instance provide a coverage cap of
business, and social issues by Lingnanians and Lingnan’s
HK$100,000. Under the proposal, only licensed banks
close associates. We shall strive to provide the best analysis
would be covered, as restricted licence banks and deposit
and commentary on the current issues of Hong Kong SAR
taking companies are not allowed to accept deposits less
and China. In addition, we will try to cover the world at
than $100,000. Insurance premia are to be charged on a
large as well if space permits. Given our limited space, of
flat rate basis. The proposal met with staunch criticism
course, we cannot cover every issue of interest in each issue.
from the bigger banks, but has been welcomed by the
But we want to do our part in making Hong Kong one of the
smaller banks. Objections are also voiced by some
most beautiful places to live in— a caring and vibrant society,
economists who warn of potential moral hazard problems.
marked by enlightened and not just well-intended policies.
To be fair, the moral hazard problems are real but
We shall strive to be careful and critical in our analysis. often exaggerated. Depending on the design, a deposit
This means that our authors will try to build their arguments
insurance plan actually can reduce moral hazard problems
carefully and will not jump to conclusions or make preand enhance competition, thus improving economic
judgements. We will be careful not to make assertions
efficiency.
without backing either by facts or by logical reasoning.
Much of the evidence about deposit insurance
Readers will find that our articles cover subjects of key
aggravating the moral hazard problem in fact merely
concern to Hong Kong people. The SAR Government has
underscores the fact that lax supervision could spell
been pleading that Hong Kong people love Hong Kong
disaster. It is well known that the savings and loans
(aigang) and love the country (aiguo). We totally agree and
debacle in the United States was associated with fraud and
indeed take this to be our mission. Our goal is to provide the
tax supervision much more than with risky investments.
most accurate analysis and the best policy recommendations.
In fact, in the US federal deposit insurance has been in
To further this goal, we will need your support and feedback.
place since 1933, and an extremely low 1/12 of one per
Please send us emails and faxes, and even give phone calls.
cent premium had been more than adequate to maintain
The Lingnan Commentary shall be the embodiment of
the system through the early 1980s. Only rapid
Lingnanians’spirit to serve.
deregulation in the 80s caused problems.
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Complemented with a sound system of supervision,
deposit insurance will enhance stability and competition.
Given the high costs of access to accurate and relevant
information for bank depositors and the difficulty of
interpreting even accurate information, it is unrealistic to
expect bank depositors to choose banks after careful and
fair assessment of all the relevant information. If
professional detectives, who have the legal authority to
look into confidential documents and interrogate key
decision makers, cannot always spot problems and cases
of fraud, the man in street certainly has little chance of
self-protection through a fair assessment of the risks of
banking with different banks. They will then be forced to
bank with the largest banks, banks that are regarded as too
big to fail. As a result, well-run, smaller banks cannot
compete with the bigger banks on a level playing field.
The bigger banks could invest in risky ventures with less
fear of chasing away depositors. This would be another
form of moral hazard.
I conclude, in the interest of stability to the banking
system and the overall economy, and in the interest of fair
competition, we need a system of bank deposit insurance.
Yet I agree that the design of our bank deposit
insurance scheme should take account of moral hazard
considerations. I recommend a bank deposit system that
would provide 100 per cent protection to all chequing
account deposits, 80 per cent protection to all savings
deposits, and 60 per cent to all time deposits. I would not
impose a ceiling to the protected amount.
Chequing account deposits in Hong Kong currently
do not earn interest. They are not in the nature of
investment and are always held only to honour payments
that are expected to come due shortly. In the absence of
protection creditors expecting payment may not get the
expected payments and this may in turn make it difficult
for them to honour their own obligations. Since
depositors do not earn interest there is no question of
taking bigger risks to earn higher returns. The “moral
hazard” problem is irrelevant.
Savings and time deposits, in contrast, do generate
income for their owners. Banks may therefore compete
for deposits by offering attractive interest rates. Banks
that pay a high interest rate may indeed make risky
investments that yield lighter returns.
Providing
fractional protection rather than full protection up to a
limit will reduce this moral harzard problem. In addition,
it will reduce transaction costs for depositors, as the latter
will most likely divide their deposits among different
banks.
Fractional protection also has important merit. It
makes it possible for the regulators to allow big banks to
fail. With the understanding that depositors will get back
the greater part of their deposits immediately bank
regulators will have less to worry about the serious
consequences of big banks collapsing. This will eliminate
the “moral hazard” problem for big banks. Without bank
deposit insurance, bigger banks will have reason to
believe that since the authorities will not allow them to
fail, they could take bigger risks in their investment
decisions and still pay lower interest rates to depositors.

By the same token, full deposit insurance up to
HK$100,000 may lead to moral hazard in yet another way.
Big depositors either put their money in banks too large to
fail, or split their deposits among many different banks
and forget about the financial health of their banks. This
will not be good for Hong Kong. Covering all deposits by
the same fraction is important because failing to do so
may hurt innocent people who do not bank with the failing
banks themselves but who are creditors to be repaid by
debtors whose deposits are affected by a bank failure.
To conclude, I would like to see fractional bank
deposit insurance introduced in Hong Kong and extended
to restricted licence banks as well as deposit taking
companies.

HOW IMPORTANT ARE CHANGES IN
PROFITS TAX TO HONG KONG’S
“COMPETITIVENESS”?
Richard Simmons
Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting
and Finance, Lingnan University
摘要
香港最近流傳快要增加利得稅的消息，令部份人
士感到憂慮。商界尤其關注加利得稅對本地吸引海外
投資所帶來潛在的衝擊。本文嘗試探討此課題的來龍
去脈，利用最近的調查數據，研究國際投資者在作出
揀選投資地區的決定時，利得稅所扮演的角色有多重
要。調查結果指出，在作出這些投資決定時，利得稅
雖然是一個重要的因素，但它只是眾多考慮因素之
一，兼且通常不是最重要的一個。此外，結果亦顯示，
在稅制的眾多特點之中，稅率只是投資者所要考慮的
其中一項而已。
Introduction
During the lead-up to the Budget speech in Hong
Kong earlier this year, it was rumoured that the rate of
company profits tax was about to be increased by half a
percentage point from the current 16 percent. At the time,
this tax hike seemed to be a distinct possibility, as the
government had previously been making well-publicised
noises about the need to find extra sources of revenue to
avoid structural budget deficits.
These rumours were seemingly confirmed the day
before the Budget. First, Executive Councillor Tam Yiuchung mentioned in a press conference after an Exco
meeting that there was “scope” for a profits tax hike.
Then, as if to confirm everyone’s growing fears, fellow
Exco member Henry Tang Ying-yen voiced his own
opinion that the rate of profits tax would be increased.
In the event, as we all know, the Budget speech that
Financial Secretary Donald Tsang finally presented
contained no reference to an increase in profits tax. But
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this was not done before vociferous warnings of the
potential effects of such a hike had been made. These
warnings naturally came from business-friendly quarters;
by contrast, those representing other interests, such as
labour, were in general much more supportive of the
move.
The majority of these warnings related to Hong
Kong’s international “competitiveness” and the threat that
the proposed tax hike posed to it. It is true that, in general,
higher taxes on profits can be seen as leaving companies
based in Hong Kong with less profit available for
reinvestment, potentially harming their future competitive
position. But in general the warnings focused on a
particular aspect of international competition: the ability
to attract new investment from overseas. For example,
one distinguished commentator voiced his concern about
competition from countries such as Singapore, which had
recently reduced its tax rate. His recommendation to the
Hong Kong government was that, rather than to increase
taxes on profits, it needed to reduce effective tax rates in
the SAR to encourage multinational investors.
The Perceived
Competitive"

Importance

of

Being

"Tax

There is no doubting the growing economic
importance of overseas investment as “globalisation” has
taken hold. In recent years, barriers to international
investment, such as capital controls and foreign exchange
restrictions, have been either dramatically reduced or
entirely eliminated in many parts of the world. This has
led to a huge rise in the level of international investment.
In the last two decades, the global rate of growth of such
investment has easily outstripped the rate of increase in
world output, and has even exceeded the impressive
growth in world trade. Of course, this development has
been reflected in the growing importance of such capital
flows to individual economies. The United Nations1
recently reported that in the UK, foreign investment in
1998 represented over 25 percent of total investment, and
for Hong Kong nearly 30 percent. The importance of
foreign investment is apparent in many developing
countries also; in China, the figure was nearly 13 percent.
The reductions in barriers to investment mentioned
above have also meant that tax differentials between
countries are now perceived as increasingly important in
influencing the location of investment. In such a global
environment, many countries around the world have
reduced their taxes on corporate profits in an attempt to
attract globally footloose capital. In one of the most
dramatic examples, Ireland reduced its tax rate on profits
from manufacturing from its traditionally high levels to
just 10 percent. Governments around the world have
taken note that many of these countries have subsequently
achieved impressive inward investment and strong
economic growth (Ireland is now the “Celtic Tiger”!).
Although it may be naïve to attribute such success stories
1

Statistics and analysis from UNCTAD's World Investment
Reports 1999 and 2000. New York: United Nations.

only to tax reductions, the impression remains that being
“tax competitive” is now crucially important to a
country’s economic well being.
But How Important is Taxation in Influencing
Investment?
In light of the above, it is perhaps not surprising that
a proposed increase in the taxation of profits in Hong
Kong, which appears to threaten foreign investment, is
met with some alarm. But to what extent is this response
justified? An answer to this question is important as it
may affect the decision as to whether any increases in
government revenues should come from profits tax or
from other sources, such as a sales tax. This article
attempts to shed some light on the matter by providing
recent evidence as to how important a role the taxation of
profits plays in the investment location decisions of
international investors.
Intuitively, one would expect the taxation of profits
to affect investment location decisions. Companies will,
everything else being equal, wish to invest in the least cost
environment, since this will provide them with the largest
returns on their capital. As taxation is likely to be a
significant component of the charges against profits of
most companies, corporations will prefer to invest in
countries which charge the lowest taxes on investment
income. Not only does raising taxes deter new investment
by multinational corporations, but it also encourages the
withdrawal of existing investment, to be relocated
elsewhere in a more tax-friendly environment.
Conversely, reducing taxes encourages funds from
overseas. Indeed, much quantitative research (primarily
concerning capital flows into and out of the US) appears
to support this.2
It seems therefore that on the face of it there are
good reasons for Hong Kong to remain tax competitive by
avoiding an increase in profits tax. However, there are
two significant problems with the argument that such an
increase will necessarily affect levels of inward
investment.
The first of these relates to the fact that not only the
country hosting the investment may wish to tax profits
from that investment. The “home” country, that is, the
country from where the investing company comes, may
wish to do so too, although normally only when the
overseas income is repatriated. This of course can lead to
a situation where the same income may be taxed twice by
different countries. To avoid this, many home countries
allow taxes paid in the host country to be credited against
taxes payable on the same income in the home country
(although no “refunds” are ever given if host country
taxation is greater than home country taxation). In such
cases, what this means in practice is that the company’s
total tax bill (that is, home plus host country taxes) on
2

A useful review of the quantitative literature can be found in
The Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on
Company Taxation, chaired by O. Ruding, March 1992. Brussels:
European Commission.
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income from overseas investment is set by the tax regime
of either the home or the host country, whichever is the
higher. In the case of low-tax Hong Kong, this normally
means that the total tax bill of a foreign investing
company is likely to be determined by the taxes of its
home country.
Thus, changes in the size of the Hong Kong tax bill
alone may not affect the company’s total tax charge: the
effect of raising or lowering profits tax in the SAR may
simply be to alter the distribution of the tax revenue
between the host and home governments. This is of
particular relevance, since the countries that have
exported the most capital to the SAR in recent years,
China, the US, Japan and the UK, all practice this system
of tax credit to some extent.
There is a second problem with the belief that, all
other things being equal, an investor will invest in the
lowest tax country: the fact that all other things are rarely
equal. For a start, there are normally many considerations
involved in these decisions other than costs, such as the
size of the potential market or the political stability of the
country. Even if one considers only costs, there are many
costs other than taxation involved, such as those for
transportation and labour.
The Views of International Investors
In order to obtain an understanding of the
importance of taxation on investment location, it is
therefore useful to compare its importance with that of the
other factors involved in the decision. An appropriate
way to do this is to survey decision-makers as to their
experiences when choosing an investment location, and
indeed several such surveys have been undertaken in
recent years. In many cases, taxation was found to be high
on the list of factors. However, in others, the greater
importance of factors such as labour costs, exchange rate
considerations, and, for emerging economies such as
China, the size of the potential market was stressed.
A problem with previous surveys has been that the
list of factors scrutinised has been less than
comprehensive. An effort to improve upon this was
undertaken by the author in February last year in a survey
of executives from 600 of the world’s largest
multinational corporations.3 The executives were given a
list of 23 factors, including the taxation of profits (and an
open item in case any important factors had been missed).
They were then asked to rate the importance of those
factors on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = not at all important, 10 =
extremely important). The results were as follows (only
the top 12 factors out of the 23 are shown):

3

See “Corporate Taxation and the Investment Location
Decisions of Multinational Corporations” by the author in The
Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation, Spring 2000.

Importance of Various Factors in the Investment Location
Decision
Ranking

Factor

1

Political stability of the
country
Size of local market
Proximity to markets
Environment in that country
Transparency/predictability
of legal and regulatory
framework
Quality of infrastructure,
communication, etc.
Availability and quality of
labour
Taxation of profits
Avoidance of obstacles to
importing to that country
(tariffs, quotas, other
restrictions)
Other strategic aims
Incidence of corruption in
that country
Availability and cost of other
basic inputs

2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12

Average
Response
7.73
7.47
7.37
7.34
7.16

7.11
7.05
6.66
6.62

6.50
6.41
6.03

The overall impression from the survey results,
consistent with prior studies, is that taxation is only one of
many factors involved in investment location decisions,
and that although important in those decisions, it is
generally not the most important one. For investment
into Hong Kong, the above survey results reinforce a
common perception: that the inflows of capital are likely
influenced much more by the market potential (the second
and third placed factors), especially that of neighbouring
China. The fact that political stability and macroeconomic conditions are also significant factors has been
borne out on several occasions in Hong Kong’s recent
history, with investment levels dropping sharply in times
of political uncertainty and in the recent economic
downturn.
Nevertheless, the above evidence implies that tax is
important to investors, and at least partly justifies the
pre-Budget warnings that an increase in Hong Kong
profits tax would scare off overseas investment.
One more point, however, should be made here
about the proposed tax hike: it concerned only a rise in the
rate of tax. Even if tax is accepted as a significant factor
in investment location decisions, the rate of tax is only
one out of many attributes of the profits tax system which
are relevant to foreign investors. Other attributes, such as
the breadth of the tax base, or the transparency of the
system, are likely to be relevant too.
In the survey mentioned above, the executives were
also asked, on the same scale of 1 to 10, to evaluate the
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importance of the various corporate tax system attributes
when evaluating the attractiveness of the system with
regard to potential investment. The results were as
follows (all 13 attributes surveyed are shown):
Importance of Corporate Tax System Attributes in the
Investment Location Decision
Ranking

Factor

1

Transparency of the tax
system
Predictability of the tax
system
Statutory tax rate
Availability and extent of
relief for double taxation
Predictability and
consistency of tax
judgements and
interpretations by the courts
Rate of withholding tax on
repatriated profit
Other benefits from
existence of relevant tax
treaties
Availability and size of
allowances, deductions, etc.
Special tax incentives for
investment (e.g. tax
holidays)
Ease and cost of complying
with tax legislation
Availability and extent of
loss relief
Effectiveness of tax
collection
Comprehensiveness and
effectiveness of antiavoidance legislation

2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

Average
Response
7.64
7.61
7.50
7.33
7.30

7.27
6.40

6.24
6.05

5.97

Some Concluding Remarks
So, what can be concluded from the above about the
recent warnings of the effect of the rise in the rate of
profits tax on investment? It should be said from the
outset that the threatened rise was a small one, and thus in
itself unlikely to change investors’decisions. Also, it has
been seen that, due to the nature of international double
tax relief, such a rise may not effect the eventual total tax
burden on foreign investors. When it is further considered
that taxation is only one, and probably not the most
important, of several potential influences on investment
location, the tax rate hike which caused such
consternation a few months ago may appear less
threatening to the SAR’s ability to attract capital.
However, it would be prudent not to underestimate
the possible effects of such a hike on inward investment.
Even though the rate of tax is only one attribute of the tax
system potentially considered by investors, the survey
results have shown that it is one of the most important. Its
“headline” quality is likely to be important in forming
investors ’ immediate perceptions of the severity of the
tax system. The results of the survey also emphasize the
importance of the predictability of the tax system.
Business thrives on certainty, as such a quality is crucial in
assuring foreign investors that their investment returns are
not to be endangered by future adverse tax developments.
Hong Kong’s tax system has been remarkably stable over
the years, and this stability is clearly one of its most
attractive features. If investors view a rise in tax rates, no
matter how small, as a portent of more serious
developments to come, it will pose a threat to this
important feature of the Hong Kong tax system. The
danger warnings issued in the run-up to the Budget will
then be seen to be justified.

5.71
5.33
5.31

From the above table, it can be seen that the tax rate,
in third place, is indeed considered one of the most
important attributes. However, so too are certain general
qualities of the tax system, that is, transparency, stability
and consistency. It is noticeable that in the case of many
of the attributes found here to be most important, the
Hong Kong profits tax system compares favourably with
other jurisdictions. For example, its system is stable and
(with some major exceptions concerning the source of
profits) transparent and predictable.
It offers
comparatively low rates of tax. In sum, the SAR would
seem to have a very attractive tax regime for investors,
with its low rate of tax being only one out of many
investor-friendly characteristics.

西部大開發的戰略動向
趙農
經濟學博士，中國社會科學院經濟研究所學者
(Zhao Nong, Ph.D., Institute of Economics,
Chinese Academy of Social Science)
Abstract
China will soon officially incorporate the West
Development Strategy into its Tenth Five Year Plan
(2001-2005).
This arrangement will certainly engender
widespread recognition and support for the strategy.
Recent policy pronouncements show that apart from
escalating its commitment of fiscal resources to promote
the cause of developing the great west, the Chinese
Government will further open up the region to foreign
investment and will further push through its market
reforms. China's commitment to develop the great west
through both policy and investment has provided a solid
basis for profitable ventures for the private sector and
particularly for foreign investors. It is expected that
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investment will focus on the densely populated and the
resource-rich areas. The sectors that stand to benefit
include financial services, research and development in
high tech industries, resource exploitation, and
infrastructure development. Given the favourable policy
and commitment of the Chinese Government to the cause
of developing the great west, a rising tide of investment
can be expected.
中國西部大開發戰略將納入“十五”計劃之
中，從而構成一項具有廣泛認同基礎的長期國策。從
近期公佈的政策內容來看，中國政府將在加大財政轉
移支付力度的同時進一步擴大西部地區的對外開放與
市場化改革。中央政府將以不可逆的投資明確傳遞該
項戰略堅決實施的信念，而市場准入條件的放寬又
外資和民間經濟贏利性的改善提供了相應的基礎。預
計投資的區域將集中在人口稠密、資源豐富、擁有潛
在市場需求的部分省市，投資的方向將主要確立在金
融服務、高新技術研發、資源的開發和利用、基礎設
施建設等領域。中央政府關於西部大開發統一政策的
制定與落實，勢必掀起西部投資的熱潮。
中國西部大開發戰略的實施受到海內外的高度
關注。它既 國內社會公平目標的實現提供了可行的
手段與途徑，還 投資者創造了無限商機。從現實的
情況看，西部大開發戰略在規劃的層面上更加顯現出
它的規範性和重要地位，在戰略的實施上呈現出堅決
和不可逆轉的態勢。作 擬訂中的“〸五 計劃的重
要組成部分，西部大開發戰略將被確定 一項具有廣
泛認同基礎的長期國策；而中央政府選定的“十大工
程”和“退耕還林（草）”等專案的運作和落實也進
一步體現該項戰略的可信性。
隨著該項戰略的逐步展開與中國加入 WTO 的日
益臨近，中央政府已決意加大西部開發的政策支援力
度。不久前，在 2000 西部開發論壇會議上，國務院西
部開發辦公室的有關負責人公佈了政策的主要內容，
其包括：（1）加大財政轉移支付力度；
（2）加大金融
信貸支援，比如，重點支援鐵路、主幹線公路、以及
大中型能源專案建設，適當延長貸款期限，提高開發
銀行新增貸款用於西部地區的比重，擴大以基礎設施
專案收費權或收益權 質押發放貸款的範圍；
（3）加
大改革力度，即深化國企改革，搞好國有經濟的戰略
性調整和資 重組；引導非公有制經濟加快發展，凡
對外商開放的投資領域，原則上允許國內各種所有制
企業進入；
（4）擴大對外開放，即鼓勵外商投資于西
部地區的農業、水利、生態、交通、能源、市政、環
保、礦產等基礎設施建設和資源開發，以及建立技術
研究開發中心；擴大西部地區服務貿易領域的對外開
放，將外商投資于銀行、商業零售企業、外貿企業的
試點擴大到直轄市、省會和自治區首府城市；允許西
部地區外資銀行逐步經營人民幣業務，並投資於電

信、保險、旅遊業、興辦中外合資會計事務所、律師
事務所、工程設計公司、鐵路和公路貨運企業、市政
公用企業等；
（5）實行稅收優惠，即對設在西部的國
家鼓勵類 業的內、外資企業，在一定時期內，減按
15% 的稅率徵收企業所得稅；對在西部的新辦交通 、
電力、水利、郵政、廣播電視等企業以及新辦高新技
術企業，企業所得稅實行兩年免征，三年減半徵收；
（6）
拓寬利用外資渠道，即擴大西部地區以 BOT 方式 TOT
方式利用外資的試點，允許外商投資專案開展包括人
民幣在內的專案融資，支援企業通過轉讓經營權、出
讓股權、兼併重組等方式吸引外商投資；鼓勵在華外
資企業到西部地區再投資，其再投資專案外資比例超
過 25%的，享受外商投資企業待遇，對外商投資西部
地區基礎設施和優勢 業專案，適當放寬外商投資的
股比限制。
從以上政策的具體內容中不難發現中央政府的
主要意圖。第一、加大財政轉移支付與金融支援的力
度，著重要表明西部大開發戰略的可信性，中央政府
通過不可逆的投資向世人做出率先進入的承諾，以此
證明該項戰略決非屬於誘致外部資金單方涉入的“空
手道 行 ，投資本身旨在 西部經濟“潛能 的釋
放創造更好的條件。第二、政府將自身的投資行 有
重點地限定在基礎設施、生態環境保護等領域，在原
則上讓開資源開發和其他競爭性領域，以使民間經濟
能夠獲得更大的贏利空間。第三、對於向外資開放銀
行、電信、保險、旅遊等服務行業和公用事業等領域，
以及放寬外資股比限制等，旨在加大開放的深度，這
也是我國加入 WTO 的有關市場准入承諾在地區的履
行上所體現的非歧視原則；這一舉措有助於減輕或消
除投資者在“入世”後對於東部投資機會的偏好，使
得西部地區能夠成 同等獲利程度的投資場所。第
四、稅收優惠政策實質上反映出中央政府對於西部地
區整體投資環境較差事實的一種承認、以及由此對於
投資者贏利性上的一種補償；而鼓勵非公有經濟的發
展則試圖提供更 公平的競爭環境。第五、上述政策
作 一種中央政府的統一政策，是要避免西部各地在
優惠政策上“層層加碼”從而形成市場割據的可能
性。東部地區曾經發生的低水平重復投資、生 平面
擴張等現象，就與各地的“優惠大戰”及政策的不統
一密不可分。
上述政策的出臺將進一步掀起西部投資的熱
潮。其實，自西部大開發戰略實施以來，外商對於西
部地區的投資興趣日漸增加。迄今，世界 500 強中已
有 80 餘家企業在我國西部地區投資或設立辦事機
構；以四川省 例，就有微軟、康柏、安然、殼牌、
日本神戶制鋼所、國際金融公司、英國商聯保險等著
名跨國公司與之簽訂投資與合作協定。跨國公司旨在
謀求長期利益，西部的資源與潛在的市場就成 這些
公司持久獲利的主要依據。因此，投資的分佈偏重於
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人口較 密集且高素質勞力較 集中的省區（如重慶
市、四川省、陝西省），比如，美國 IBM 公司以資助
等形式與成都、重慶、西安三地的多所大學建立了廣
泛的合作關係，在西安投資 2000 多萬美元搭建大型軟
體發展平臺，還與我國西部最大的軟體企業四川托普
洽談合作事宜。投資方向則主要集中在資源開發、高
新技術、環保等領域，比如，美國安然公司在成都投
資設立了四川嘉陵電力有限公司，最近又計劃與國內
大企業合作投資開發四川天然氣資源；日本三井物
株式會社正積極介入成都垃圾焚燒發電、四川廣安電
站等能源開發和環保建設專案。
可以預見，西部大開發的新政策將促使西部外商
投資領域與投資規模的顯著擴大。銀行、保險、電信、
旅遊、以及其他專業性服務
（會計、律師事務所業務）
，
將成 下一輪投資的熱點。據悉，諸如法國巴黎銀行、
美國花旗銀行、英國 豐銀行、日本富士銀行、東京
三菱銀行、英國商聯保險公司、東京海上保險公司、
紐約人壽保險公司、美國聯邦快遞公司等服務業巨頭
雲集西部開發論壇，其表現出較大的投資意願。此外，
諸如“西氣東輸”、“西電東送”等巨型專案也引起
跨國公司的高度關注，或許這類專案的高投資與穩定
性恰好符合跨國公司的特性。稅收優惠還可以促使外
商在給定領域的投資增加。不過，國有企業經營權的
轉讓、股權的出讓、以及外資股比的提高固然可以增
加外商投資的選擇度，但由於外商對國企弊端、證券
市場不完善和與政府磨和所致拖累的擔憂，針對外商
投資于國企改造的力度不應抱有過於樂觀的估計。
總之，西部大開發戰略尚處於政策導向的階段。
儘管政策支援力度的加強無疑會推動該項戰略的深入
實施，但是只有當決策者面臨較 恒定的法治環境
時，其決策才能在相對確定的預期比較中審慎做出，
其行 才具有長期理性的約束和規範。這顯然有待於
中央政府將西部大開發戰略構築在堅實的法律基礎
上，同時要求西部地區必須推進整體的市場化改革。
值得欣喜的是，西部許多城市已在市政等領域加大了
改革的力度，西部大開發正沿著法治的軌道向前邁
進。

the 90’s four phases of development can be discerned.
1991 to 1992 is a phase of vibrant growth and overheating.
1993 to 1996 is a phase of macroeconomic adjustment
under austerity measures, which eventually achieved soft
landing. 1997 to 1999 is a period of continuous downward
adjustment. Finally, starting in 2000 is a new phase of
faster growth, estimated at 8% for that year. This article
discusses three causes for this development, and expresses
optimism that economic growth in China from now on is
likely to be more steady, more lasting, and somewhat
faster.

中國經濟增長呈現重大轉機

小階段：(1) 1991－1992 年的兩年。經濟增長越過上

2000 年，中國經濟增長扭轉了連續七年的下滑
之勢，出現了新的回升或重大轉機（見圖和表）
。進入
2001 年後，中國經濟有望保持這一新的增長勢頭。
%
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（％）
3.8
9.2
14.2
13.5
12.6
10.5
9.6
8.8
7.8
7.1
8.0

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994
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1992
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1990

3.8
2

商品零售價格上漲率
（％）
2.1
2.9
5.4
13.2
21.7
14.8
6.1
0.8
－2.6
－3.0
－1.0

預計數。

90 年代，中 國經濟的增長和波動可以分

劉樹成

常欣

（劉樹成，中國社會科學院經濟研究所所長、研究員；
常欣，中國社會科學院經濟研究所博士）
(Liu Shucheng, Director, Institute of Economics,
Chinese Academy of Social Science;
Chang Xin, Ph.D., Institute of Economics, CASS)
Abstract
In the year 2000 economic growth in China reversed
a downward trend, that had lasted some seven years. In

四個

一輪波動的低谷，進入新一輪波動的上升期。經濟增
長率從 1990 年的 3.8％，上升到 1992 年 14.2％的高
峰。兩年內，經濟增長率上升跳躍了 10.4 個百分點。
經濟增長出現過熱狀態。(2) 1993－1996 年的四年 。
實行緊縮性的宏觀調控政策，經濟運行成功地實現了
“軟著陸”。經濟增長率由 1992 年 14.2％的高峰，回
落到 1996 年的 9.6％，共回落 4.6 個百分點，平均每
年回落 1.15 個百分點。與此同時，物價上漲率從 1994
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年 21.7％的高峰，回落到 6.1％。(3) 1997－1999 年的
三年。按照 1953 年－1990 年中國經濟歷次波動的情
況，經濟增長率的下落期最短的
平均

1 年，最長的 4 年，

2.75 年。依此，1996 年實現“軟著陸”後，經

濟增長率本應止滑企穩，或止跌回升，然而又繼續下
滑了三年。從 1996 年的 9.6％，下滑到 1999 年的 7.1
％，又下滑了 2.5 個百分點，平均每年下滑 0.83 個百
分點。與此同時，出現了通貨緊縮趨勢。(4) 2000 年，
第一到第三季度，經濟增長率達到 8.2％，全年預計
8％左右，終於呈現出回升的轉機。
弄清 1997－1999 年中國經濟增長率繼續下滑的
原因，有助於我們把握今後中國經濟增長的特點。這
幾年的下滑，實際上反映出經過改革開放 20 餘年的歷
程，中國經濟運行的大背景已經發生了重要變化。其
一，中國經濟與世界經濟的聯繫更加緊密。這一方面
有利於促進國內經濟的增長，另一方面也使國內經濟
的發展受到國際經濟動蕩的衝擊和影響。1997 年的亞
洲金融危機，對中國的對外貿易和引進外資都

生了

嚴重影響。其二，長期以來商品短缺狀況基本結束，
出現了買方市場格局。這一方面是綜合國力提高的結
果，另一方面也
度，對

經濟增長率的回升帶來一定的難

業結構的調整和升級提出了新要求。其三，

市場取向的經濟體制改革取得了實質性進展，預算約
束趨於硬化。這一方面有利於抑制長期存在的投資饑
渴和盲目擴張衝動，另一方面也

需求回升特別是民

間投資的回升帶來一定的難度。
這些重要變化預示著 2001 年後中國經濟增長與
波動可能會呈現出與過去不同的新特點。按照 1953
年－1992 年中國經濟歷次波動的情況，經濟增長率的
上升期最短的 1 年，最長的 3 年，平均僅

2 年；波

峰年份經濟增長率的平均值高達 14.4％。今後，在新
一輪波動的上升期，經濟增長率的回升不會像過去那
樣短促和過高，回升的持續時間將會延長，回升的速
度將會相對平穩和較快。這是因 ：(1) 從需求面看，
投資需求和消費需求盲目擴張的體制基礎已經改變，
在預算約束趨於硬化的條件下，建立與完善適應市場
經濟要求的民間投資正常形成機制和居民消費正常形
成機制，要有一個過程。(2) 從供給面看，在買方市場
格局下，需要

業結構、

品結構的新突破來打開新

市場，而經濟結構的調整也有一個過程。(3) 提高國民
經濟與社會的資訊化，實施西部大開發戰略 ，推進城
鎮化發展進程，以加入 WTO
放，

契機的全方位對外開

中國經濟在未來五到〸年內繼續保持較快的增

長勢頭提供了可能。(4) 繼續實施積極的財政政策和穩
健的貨幣政策，努力培育和發展資本市場，也有利於
保持經濟的快速、健康增長。
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Small and Medium Private Enterprises and
their Financing Constraints in the People's
Republic of China
Clement Kong Wing Chow
Associate Director, Hong Kong Institute of
Business Studies, Lingnan University
摘要
在內地的中小型私人企業在為投資項目而籌集
資金上，往往遇上以下的問題 ：中小型私企往外籌集
資金的成本會遠高於使用企業的內部資金的成本。原
因有二： (1)資本市場存在著一些缺陷，例如交易成
本，資訊不對稱（Asymmetric information）和管轄代
理問題(Agency problem)。(2)歷史上，借貸政策的偏差
問題難以在短期內靠現在的金融改革而解決。加入世
界貿易組織之後，內地的金融制度將會慢慢演變成漸
近西方發展國家的體制，但這種發展不會完全解決因
為資本市場的缺陷所造成的外部集資成本偏高的問
題。中小型私企將面對更強烈競爭，勢必大大削低它
們的營利及累積內部資金的能力，所以入了世貿組織
後，中小型私企所面對的集資困難將會更大。
According to the celebrated Modigliani-Miller
theorem, financing an investment project via internal or
external funds is a matter of irrelevance should capital
markets be perfect. However, in the presence of
asymmetric information and agency problems,
imperfections prevail in the real-world capital markets,
making the costs of external financing much higher than
those of internal financing. This may lead to underinvestments for cash-constrained firms. Private
enterprises in the People's Republic of China particularly
face this under-investment problem in that they normally
have difficulty in obtaining enough external funds to
exploit profitable investment opportunities.
The essence of the Modigliani and Miller theorem is
that a firm’s capital structure and financial policy can be
replicated by individual investors on their own accounts in
perfect capital markets. Financial structure (liquidity,
leverage, dividend payments, etc.) as such creates no firm
value and thus an enterprise should regard internal and
external funding as perfect substitutes of each other.
In the real world, capital markets are far from
perfect. Three factors, namely, transaction costs,
asymmetric information, and agency problems, attribute
to a well-documented financial hierarchy wherein firms
prefer internal financing to external financing via debt and
equity. First, transaction costs of issuing debt and equity
can be high. These costs include compensation for
underwriters, registration fees, taxes, and accounting
costs.
Second, asymmetric information can generate
significant cost disadvantages of external financing.
Management of a firm typically has information about the
return of its project which is unavailable to outside

investors. Because investors cannot distinguish between
good and bad projects, they price every issue as if the
project return was average. This implies that a firm with a
good project is obliged to issuing under-priced securities,
thereby resulting in higher costs of external financing than
those of internal financing. Asymmetric information
between enterprises and potential suppliers of external
funds is also the source of adverse selection and/or moral
hazard problems in credit markets. Increases in interest
rates cause enterprises with good investment prospect to
leave the applicant pool (adverse selection) or induce
enterprises to switch to riskier projects (moral hazard). As
a result, potential lenders may prefer to ration credit. All
these suggest that external financing, in the presence of
asymmetric information, is either rationed or available at
a premium.
Third, the presence of agency problem may also
induce a cost premium to the use of external funds. Under
the asymmetry of information, managers of an enterprise
may pursue their own interests at the expense of the
stockholders and bondholders. This conflict of interests
can boost the cost of obtaining external funds as outside
shareholders attempt to control management behavior
through the use of audits, budget control, and incentive
systems designed to align the managers’ interests with
theirs. These actions impart a cost premium to the use of
outside equity, reflecting both the direct costs of
monitoring management and the losses of profit
opportunities due to reduced management flexibility.
Debtors also face similar risk as management actions may
dissipate enterprise resources and erode the value of
existing debt by undertaking excessively risky projects.
Debtors as such may demand covenants which restrict
management behavior in various ways. These restrictions
and the monitoring required for contractual enforcement
constitute the agency costs of debt.
As external funds are more costly, academics
propose a pecking order framework which suggests that
enterprises finance their funding needs in a hierarchical
fashion, first using internally available funds, then
followed by debt and outside equity. When internal and
external financing are imperfect substitutes of each other
in the presence of capital market imperfections,
investment decisions of an enterprise will be constrained
by the availability of internal funds. Moreover, financing
constraint impacts different enterprises unequally. Small
and medium enterprises are expected to face an even
higher cost in accessing external funds as compared with
large and well-established enterprises. Therefore, small
and medium private enterprises end up being more
dependent on internal funds in financing their investment.
As economic conditions in a transition economy
such as China are different from those in developed
market economies, the role of internal financing in
determining the level of investment can be different from
what may apply to firms in developed economies. The
capital markets in transition economies are either not
available or underdeveloped. Therefore, enterprises in
transition economies are all heavily dependent on bank
credit, which is probably the only source of external funds,
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for financing fixed investment. Banks are mainly owned
and controlled by the state even though decentralization
and devolution have been carried out rapidly in the other
sectors of these economies. Since the non-state sectors in
these economies were much smaller than the state-owned
sectors before the implementation of economic reforms,
the allocation of credit was always biased in favor of
state-owned enterprises. Such a 'lending bias' in favor of
these large state enterprises will continue even though the
banking reform has been carried out.
Small and medium private enterprises in China are
not totally helpless despite the fact that they have more
difficulty in obtaining external finances as compared with
large and established enterprises. Small and medium
private enterprises are relatively more efficient than their
larger state-owned counterparts. Given their managerial
efficiency, they may be able to generate large enough cash
flows to finance their fixed investment. Moreover, these
small and medium enterprises can also borrow from the
informal credit market, notwithstanding the fact that they
can only obtain very limited bank credit from the formal
banking institutions.
In the future, there are two major factors that will
substantially change the current status quo. First, China’s
expected entry into the World Trade Organization will
lead to a substantial elimination of trade barriers such as
tariffs and quotas, which may erode the profits of these
small and medium enterprises in the non-state sector
when imported products are supplied at lower prices. In
this case, they may be unable to generate enough internal
funds for fixed investment in a more competitive
environment.
Second, reforms in the financial sector may not
improve the supply of external funds to small and medium
private enterprises in the non-state sectors. Current
reforms in the financial system are pushing the state
banking system to operate in a more efficient way and pay
more attention to the risk management in credit allocation.
When the state banking system is operating more like
those in developed market economies, small and medium
private enterprises in China may face similar constraints
in accessing external funds due to capital market
imperfections. Moreover, as more foreign banks will be
allowed to take Renminbi deposits, the supply of loanable
funds to small and medium private enterprises through the
informal credit market, which is expected to be replaced
by formal credit market, will be reduced as well. When
small and medium private enterprises receive less credit
from both the formal and informal credit markets in the
next wave of financial reforms, they may find it difficult
to finance their fixed investment. An active government
policy on small business development which helps them
to obtain external funds may be a necessary component of
the overall economic reform.

The Issues of Workplace Safety and Public
Policies in Hong Kong
Wei Xiangdong
Associate Professor, Department of Economics
Lingnan University
摘要
職業安全問題近年來成為香港公眾十分關注的
一個問題。由政府公布的工傷死亡率數字可看出，香
港的職業安全問題遠較一些發達的西方國家嚴重。本
文從經濟學的角度簡述了職業安全與勞工市場及政府
公共政策之間的關係，並總結了作者所作的一項公共
政策對職業安全影響的仿真研究的結果，提出了可供
政府參考的一些未來政策調整建議。
I.

Introduction

Hong Kong has long been criticised for its poor
workplace safety records. The work-related fatality rate
for Hong Kong is several times those in the US and the
UK (see Table 1). In the past 10 years, 2000 workers in
total were killed and 100,000 were injured at work. The
construction of the Chek Lap Kok airport alone cost 49
workers’ lives.
Table 1. Comparison of Safety Systems in the US, UK and
HK for 1995
US
5.65

UK
2.28

HK
14.32

Inspections

94,539

88,571

89,138

Inspections
resulting in
citations

31,198

1,499

3,387

Fatality rate
(1/100,000)

Average fine per
inspection

US$955

Number of firms
1,086,923
Production sector:

*

US$4,597 US$1,494
286,235

102,807

Probability of
Inspection

0.09

0.31

0.87

Expected Fine

US$27

US$24

US$49

Experience-rated
insurance system

yes

no

yes

Wage replacement
ratio for a death
under Workers’
Comp.

0.5

0.24*

0.3**

Paid under the State Incapacity Benefit (Long-term
rate). However, this rate does not include other
possible State benefits, such as child benefits, etc. The
UK benefits are also not directly linked to employers'
contribution.
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** For HK, the 30% rate is estimated based on a person at
age of 40 when injured.
Each year, several serious industrial accidents hit
the headlines of local newspapers and prompt a renewed
debate on whether Hong Kong needs more stringent
government workplace safety regulation. A recent
consultation paper prepared by the Education and
Manpower Branch (1995) concluded that a better way to
control workplace accidents would be to place more
emphasis on self-regulation by employers and employees
whose own workplace behaviour determines accident
rates. However, many unionists and workers believe that
more effective direct regulation is needed to control
industrial accidents in Hong Kong.
Without knowing the efficiency of direct
government regulation it is difficult to determine whether
society would be better off with stricter regulations. A
recent research project by this author together with Ho
Lok Sang, Robert Sandy and Stan Siebert attempted to
look at this issue with a simulation model. This short
paper intends to discuss some of the theoretical issues
behind this study and summarizes its main findings.
II.

The Economics of Workplace Safety and Policies

According to standard economic theory, a worker is
paid both in terms of wages and working conditions. We
can think of the “full wage” of a job as being the money
wage adjusted for the benefits and disamenities of the job.
A worker’s skills determine his/her full wage, and his/her
tastes then determine the mix between money wages and
working conditions. Workers seek out jobs that have the
mix of wages and working conditions that they prefer.
Given competition, the job characteristics that workers
generally dislike should then command high wages, other
things equal. Such jobs will offer positive compensating
wage differentials (CWDs). Jobs with enjoyable working
conditions conversely will offer negative CWDs. This is a
reflection of the “law of one price” operating in a
competitive labour market.
One could argue that, provided that the market
operates freely, the resulting equilibrium in wages and
safety levels would allow people get what they want, and
so no government intervention will be needed. However,
workplace safety possesses the characteristics of a public
good. Many safety measures affect the safety levels of all
workers at the same workplace. In addition, there is also
the problem of asymmetric information. It may be
difficult for a new employee to know the true workplace
safety level of a firm and may therefore not demand the
fair CWDs. Both of these problems may be alleviated
with the presence of trade unions which may monitor the
performance of the firm/industry continuously. However,
firm/ industry based unions may or may not be present,
while wider-based unions may act to represent the interest
of “median voters” and therefore ignore those of the
marginal workers who carry out the most dangerous jobs.
Furthermore, workplace safety is something the entire

society can be proud of, while a poor safety record may be
taken as shameful.
With these labour market imperfections in mind,
government policies are often called for to regulate the
workplace safety and/or to compensate injury workers.
The typical policies conducted by many governments are:
(1) to regulate workplace safety levels by setting up
standards and codes of practice; (2) to run a no-fault
compulsory insurance system to cover compensation for
workers suffering from injuries. However, it is often
found that the working of these policies is not all that
satisfactory. Typically, accidents rates dropped somewhat
immediately after the implementation of these policies
and then more or less stagnated. The problems associated
with the policies are as follows. First, it is simply difficult
to enforce safety standards. Second, the fines associated
with the violation of standards are often too low due to the
fear of driving firms out of their business. Third, workers’
compensation insurance serves the role of ex-post
compensation for injury while CWDs serve the role of
ex-ante compensation for injury. In general, compulsory
insurance schemes cannot serve as an extra punishment
for accident-prone firms, given the rather meagre
compensation under insurance schemes. (My estimate for
the value of a statistical life using CWDs in Hong Kong is
about HK$10.8, which is six times higher than the highest
compensation for workers suffering from fatal or total
disability accident). Fourth, higher benefit level tends to
attract more reports of accidents and claims. Raising
benefit levels may also make workers take less precaution.
Finally, market adjustments can never take care of the
external cost of accidents on society at large due to a
record of high industrial fatalities and injuries.
III.

The Policy Simulation and Its Main Results

The current setting of the working place health and
safety policy in Hong Kong is mainly governed by three
legislations, namely the Factories and Industrial
Undertakings Ordinance, the Occupational Health and
Safety Ordinance and the Employees’ Compensation
Ordinance. The former two Ordinances empower the
government to set up and enforce various safety
regulations while the last Ordinance establishes a no-fault,
non-contributory employees’ compensation system
whereby all employers are required by law to buy
insurance to cover compensation.
In Table 1, we compare Hong Kong’s workplace
safety policies with those of the US and UK. It confirms
that Hong Kong's current policy settings combine some of
the advantages of the policies in both the US and the UK.
In particular, the employees' compensation insurance
system in Hong Kong possesses some features of an
experience-rated insurance system, which can stimulate
employers to improve safety. The regulatory framework
in Hong Kong bears much resemblance to the UK system.
Targeted safety inspection of highly risky workplace and
relatively strict enforcement of safety standards proved to
be important to reduce workplace accidents in Hong Kong.
However, there are also a number of weaknesses in Hong
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Kong's current system. Compared with the US, the benefit
levels of the employees' compensation insurance system
may be too low to create enough incentive for employers
to reduce accidents. The persistent high accident rates in
the construction sector indicates that the enforcement
actions taken by the Labour Department may not be
sufficient for some of the employers in HK. The average
fine charged for violation of safety standards in the UK is
several times higher than that in HK.
Since Hong Kong has relatively low benefits under
its Workers’ Compensation system and relatively low
expected fines, it clearly has the ability to substantially
raise either of these variables. We conduct policy
simulation to gauge the effects of changes to each of these
policies.
Our simulation results revealed t hat although a large
increase in employees' compensation benefits created
more incentive for employers to control accidents, it has
very minor effects on the overall safety level. This is
because it encourages employees to take more risky jobs.
It casts doubt over the claim that the benefit levels are too
low and an increase in benefits in Hong Kong may reduce
accidents. However, we did find that a greater use of
experience-rated insurance helps to reduce accidents.
Next, we found that the increase of fines for violation of
safety regulations may have more significant effects on
reducing accidents. But, as the required increase is
substantial for the policy to have a significant impact it is
therefore envisaged that such a change would be difficult
to implement. An alternative policy that can significantly
reduce accidents but without significantly raising the
average fine is a progressive injury tax policy that makes
accident-prone firms pay more fines. Our simulation
model should be useful for future policy studies in this
area.
To conclude,
we
have
the
following
recommendations for the government:
Ÿ

Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ

Ÿ

Step up enforcement actions against accident-prone
firms specially those in the construction sector, in
part by increasing fines, in part by strengthening
inspections;
Devote more resources into accident data collection
and analysis and publish more data to the public.
Strengthen legislation to punish those firms who
cheat on insurance premiums by understating their
payrolls to insurance companies.
The government should NOT increase employees'
compensation benefit sharply as this will not help
reduce accidents.
In the long-run, we suggest that the government
needs to review the current costs of the employees'
compensation insurance, specially its associated
tort costs, and seek to improve a more effective, less
costly compensation mechanism.
We strongly propose that the government consider
introduce an injury tax mechanism with progressive
tax rates. The injury tax is charged on a firm when
it commits an industrial accident regardless of
whether the firm has violated safety standards or not.

Ÿ

A steep tax will certainly make employers find
more effective ways of reducing accidents.
For firms that have violated safety standards, the
government should be bold in laying charges and
the courts should be more ready to impose further
fines and/or other punishments. The levy and fine
collected from accident will then be put into a fund
to compensate injured workers. Such a system can
reduce the huge administrative and tort costs of the
insurance system and can also increase incentives
for firms to reduce accidents.

Tax the Central Crossing, Subsidize the
Western Crossing
Lok Sang Ho
Director, Centre for Public Policy Studies
Lingnan University
摘要
增加中區隧道收費，並以收益增加所得來補貼西隧，
保持西隧收費廉宜，既可提高西隧使用率，也可減低
中區隧道擠塞，是兩全其美的辦法。
Because the Western Harbour Crossing has accumulated
huge losses, it decided to raise the toll, from $30 to $40 for
private vehicles. However, for the time being a $5
discount is given, leading to an effective $35 charge.
After the price increase, it was found that tunnel traffic
fell by some 10 per cent. It is believed that most of this
reduced traffic was diverted to the central crossing,
rendering that crossing even more congested than before.
We know enough economics to be very positive in
our assessment about this matter. The price increase for
the Western Harbour Crossing reduces social welfare.
Something can and should be done to improve welfare for
everybody.
The Western Harbour Crossing is expensive to build.
Yet it is now an important trunk road. The Government
had made a deal with the company that it would not
interfere with its pricing policy. That was the lure for the
company to make the investment in the first place.
However, even though the western crossing is losing
money, it is an essential part of Hong Kong’s internal
transportation system. Most of the airport buses have to
use the western crossing; many of the residents of the new
town of Tung Chung as well as North West New
Territories have to depend on it to get to work; and the
western crossing certainly has helped relieve the very
serious congestion in the central crossing.
Since it is expensive to build, we should use it as
much as possible as long as the use generates net benefit.
Given that the western crossing is already very much
underutilized relative to the design capacity, we should
reduce the toll, certainly not to increase it.
By reducing the toll, we can help relieve traffic
congestion in the central crossing. The time savings for
all of its users should be worth tens of million dollars a
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month. A user of the central crossing would be quite
willing to pay, say 5 dollars, to save 10 minutes. Of
course some would be willing to pay more, others less. If
we impose a five dollar surcharge on the central crossing,
we would generate sufficient revenue to subsidize and
thus lower the charges from the previous $30 to $25 and
net a sizeable positive cash flow for the company.
Western Harbour Crossing users will be happy. Central
Crossing users, having to pay $25 instead of $20, will also
be happy, because of significant time savings expected.
The Western Harbour Crossing company will also be
happy. We will have what economists call “Pareto
improvement.”

This is a clear case for government intervention to
improve social welfare. It shows that government
intervention is sometimes justified. This conclusion is
very clear because we do not need to deploy extra
resources to tax the central crossing and to subsidize the
western crossing. But it requires enlightened thinking, a
break from the dogmatic belief that government
intervention is always bad. Does our government know
enough economics to make the change?
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